During the exercise, we tried using volshell from Volatility, a python script, and strings.
Looking at processes active is pretty standard for a memory dump so we did that:
root# vol.py -f memdump.dd --profile=WinXPSP3x86 volshell Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.2 Current context: process System, pid=4, ppid=0 DTB=0x6bc0000 Welcome to volshell! Current memory image is: memdump.dd To get help, type 'hh()' >>> ps() Name PID PPID Offset [...] TrueCrypt.exe 1544 1752 0x86687da0 [...] >>>The TrueCrypt.exe process seemed promising, so we scoured the strings of the process dump. Little did we know that this was pointless, because the only stuff in the TrueCrypt userland process is GUI stuff.
We started reading Ram is Key at this point.
The most helpful piece of knowledge to have whilst diving into RAM is Key is to realize the difference between a key and a passphrase. A key is the cryptographic sequence that AES uses to encrypt and decrypt data. The average user has no idea about the key. The passphrase is the user supplied cryptographic material. Hopefully the user knows about the passphrase.
This picture shows the keys used by TrueCrypt, which obviously are machine generated:
RAM is Key talked a lot about drivers and kernel space. MSDN was an extremely useful reference. These in particular: DEVICE_OBJECT, DRIVER_OBJECT, Device Extensions.
Thus, doing some driver-oriented volatility plugins seemed great:
root# vol.py -f memdump.dd --profile=WinXPSP3x86 devicetree [...] DRV 0x01e4d030 \Driver\truecrypt ---| DEV 0x81fc0200 TrueCryptVolumeE FILE_DEVICE_DISK ---| DEV 0x81cf75d0 TrueCrypt FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN [...] root#A deep understanding of what devicetree does is very helpful.
Device Extensions turned out to be a rabbit trail when pursuing passphrases, but they seem to be useful for extracting keys, though one would need to look at the Truecrypt driver source code to make any sense of Truecrypt's particular Device Extension structure. Without doing any further research, here's what I found in the device extension which I guess was mildly useful:
>>> dt("_DEVICE_OBJECT", 0x81fc0200)
[_DEVICE_OBJECT _DEVICE_OBJECT] @ 0x81FC0200
0x0 : Type 3
0x2 : Size 1416
0x4 : ReferenceCount 3
0x8 : DriverObject 2179256368
0xc : NextDevice 2177856976
0x10 : AttachedDevice 0
0x14 : CurrentIrp 0
0x18 : Timer 0
0x1c : Flags 80
0x20 : Characteristics 256
0x24 : Vpb 2183885000
0x28 : DeviceExtension 2180776632
0x2c : DeviceType 7
0x30 : StackSize 7
0x34 : Queue 2180776500
0x5c : AlignmentRequirement 0
0x60 : DeviceQueue 2180776544
0x74 : Dpc 2180776564
0x94 : ActiveThreadCount 0
0x98 : SecurityDescriptor 3778765672
0x9c : DeviceLock 2180776604
0xac : SectorSize 512
0xae : Spare1 0
0xb0 : DeviceObjectExtension 2180777864
0xb4 : Reserved 0
"Type" being 3 is important because that means we were right about overlaying the _DEVICE_OBJECT over the chosen address.
>>> db(2180776632, 800) 0x81fc02b8 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc02c8 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc02d8 38 6a 1c 82 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 e4 02 fc 81 8j.............. 0x81fc02e8 e4 02 fc 81 00 00 00 00 f0 02 fc 81 f0 02 fc 81 ................ 0x81fc02f8 05 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 a8 6a 1c 82 a8 6a 1c 82 .........j...j.. 0x81fc0308 ff ff ff 7f 0c 01 00 80 a8 21 18 82 20 30 e4 81 .........!...0.. 0x81fc0318 00 d0 cd 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 06 00 00 00 00 ..........@..... 0x81fc0328 00 00 3c 06 00 00 00 00 00 1e 03 00 00 00 00 00 ..<............. 0x81fc0338 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc0348 00 02 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 54 03 fc 81 ............T... 0x81fc0358 54 03 fc 81 00 00 00 00 00 02 fc 81 02 00 08 00 T............... 0x81fc0368 01 00 00 00 6c 03 fc 81 6c 03 fc 81 50 37 17 82 ....l...l...P7.. 0x81fc0378 50 37 17 82 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 c8 11 35 82 P7............5. 0x81fc0388 00 d0 cd 81 0c 01 00 80 00 00 3c 06 00 00 00 00 ..........<..... 0x81fc0398 4c 07 fc 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 L............... 0x81fc03a8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc03b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc03c8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc03d8 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 e0 03 fc 81 e0 03 fc 81 ................ 0x81fc03e8 f8 fb e9 81 ec 03 fc 81 ec 03 fc 81 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc03f8 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 68 fc e9 81 68 fc e9 81 ........h...h... 0x81fc0408 70 38 11 82 0c 04 fc 81 0c 04 fc 81 00 00 00 00 p8.............. 0x81fc0418 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 e0 38 11 82 e0 38 11 82 .........8...8.. 0x81fc0428 40 37 17 82 2c 04 fc 81 2c 04 fc 81 00 00 00 00 @7..,...,....... 0x81fc0438 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 b0 37 17 82 b0 37 17 82 .........7...7.. 0x81fc0448 00 d0 c9 81 00 d0 c5 81 01 00 04 00 01 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc0458 58 04 fc 81 58 04 fc 81 01 00 04 00 01 00 00 00 X...X........... 0x81fc0468 68 04 fc 81 68 04 fc 81 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 h...h........... 0x81fc0478 00 c4 0e 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc0488 00 c6 0e 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 d0 c1 81 ................ 0x81fc0498 00 00 40 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 00 ..@............. 0x81fc04a8 00 00 00 00 ac 04 fc 81 ac 04 fc 81 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc04b8 01 00 04 00 01 00 00 00 c0 04 fc 81 c0 04 fc 81 ................ 0x81fc04c8 00 56 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .V.............. 0x81fc04d8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc04e8 00 00 00 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 f4 04 fc 81 ................ 0x81fc04f8 f4 04 fc 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc0508 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc0518 5c 00 3f 00 3f 00 5c 00 43 00 3a 00 5c 00 44 00 \.?.?.\.C.:.\.D. 0x81fc0528 6f 00 63 00 75 00 6d 00 65 00 6e 00 74 00 73 00 o.c.u.m.e.n.t.s. 0x81fc0538 20 00 61 00 6e 00 64 00 20 00 53 00 65 00 74 00 ..a.n.d...S.e.t. 0x81fc0548 74 00 69 00 6e 00 67 00 73 00 5c 00 6c 00 75 00 t.i.n.g.s.\.u.s. 0x81fc0558 6b 00 65 00 5c 00 44 00 65 00 73 00 6b 00 74 00 e.r.\.D.e.s.k.t. 0x81fc0568 6f 00 70 00 5c 00 74 00 63 00 63 00 6f 00 6e 00 o.p.\.t.c.c.o.n. 0x81fc0578 74 00 61 00 69 00 6e 00 65 00 72 00 00 00 00 00 t.a.i.n.e.r..... 0x81fc0588 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc0598 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc05a8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc05b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0x81fc05c8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................So, the TrueCrypt (TC) volume open in this memory dump is "C:\Documents and Settings\user\Desktop\tccontainer". If the name of the TC volume wasn't so generic, it may be useful to spin off an indexing of the strings in the memory image, and then a grep. The "strings" module of volatility would have to be used in order to map the file offset to an actual memory offset.
At this point, I determined, mostly from reading RAM is Key, that the best way to find the passphrase would be to dump the executable space of the truecrypt driver, and search it with the format [1 byte size][3 null bytes][passphrase][1 null byte], however, after dumping the driver, I found the passphrase. The easiest way to find where the truecrypt driver lives is to use "driverscan" volatility module. We'll do it the more interesting way, however. Same device object as before:
>>> dt("_DEVICE_OBJECT", 0x81fc0200)
[_DEVICE_OBJECT _DEVICE_OBJECT] @ 0x81FC0200
0x0 : Type 3
0x2 : Size 1416
0x4 : ReferenceCount 3
0x8 : DriverObject 2179256368
0xc : NextDevice 2177856976
0x10 : AttachedDevice 0
0x14 : CurrentIrp 0
0x18 : Timer 0
0x1c : Flags 80
0x20 : Characteristics 256
0x24 : Vpb 2183885000
0x28 : DeviceExtension 2180776632
0x2c : DeviceType 7
0x30 : StackSize 7
0x34 : Queue 2180776500
0x5c : AlignmentRequirement 0
0x60 : DeviceQueue 2180776544
0x74 : Dpc 2180776564
0x94 : ActiveThreadCount 0
0x98 : SecurityDescriptor 3778765672
0x9c : DeviceLock 2180776604
0xac : SectorSize 512
0xae : Spare1 0
0xb0 : DeviceObjectExtension 2180777864
0xb4 : Reserved 0
>>> dt("_DRIVER_OBJECT", 2179256368)
[_DRIVER_OBJECT _DRIVER_OBJECT] @ 0x81E4D030
0x0 : Type 4
0x2 : Size 168
0x4 : DeviceObject 2180776448
0x8 : Flags 18
0xc : DriverStart 2986721280
0x10 : DriverSize 224128
0x14 : DriverSection 2182800832
0x18 : DriverExtension 2179256536
0x1c : DriverName \Driver\truecrypt
0x24 : HardwareDatabase 2154363536
0x28 : FastIoDispatch 0
0x2c : DriverInit 2986935637
0x30 : DriverStartIo 0
0x34 : DriverUnload 2986747628
0x38 : MajorFunction -
>>> db(2986721280, 224128)
Memory unreadable at b205c000
Now, that doesn't really mean that memory is unreadable at b205c000h, just that 224128 bytes after b205c000h is not readable. I do not know why this is true, but I just adjusted the bounds down until it worked:
>>> db(0xb205c000, 0x35000) [...] [watch pretty ascii flow by] [...] 0xb2090e10 6c 45 71 75 61 6c 53 69 64 00 d9 04 53 65 51 75 lEqualSid...SeQu 0xb2090e20 65 72 79 49 6e 66 6f 72 6d 61 74 69 6f 6e 54 6f eryInformationTo 0xb2090e30 6b 65 6e 00 e5 04 53 65 54 6f 6b 65 6e 49 73 41 ken...SeTokenIsA 0xb2090e40 64 6d 69 6e 00 00 c4 04 53 65 43 61 70 74 75 72 dmin....SeCaptur 0xb2090e50 65 53 75 62 6a 65 63 74 43 6f 6e 74 65 78 74 00 eSubjectContext. 0xb2090e60 1d 02 4b 65 49 6e 69 74 69 61 6c 69 7a 65 53 65 ..KeInitializeSe 0xb2090e70 6d 61 70 68 6f 72 65 00 30 02 4b 65 51 75 65 72 maphore.0.KeQuer 0xb2090e80 79 49 6e 74 65 72 72 75 70 74 54 69 6d 65 00 00 yInterruptTime.. 0xb2090e90 c7 04 53 65 43 72 65 61 74 65 43 6c 69 65 6e 74 ..SeCreateClient 0xb2090ea0 53 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 00 00 c5 03 52 74 6c 43 Security....RtlC 0xb2090eb0 6f 70 79 53 69 64 00 00 4c 04 52 74 6c 4c 65 6e opySid..L.RtlLen 0xb2090ec0 67 74 68 53 69 64 00 00 59 01 49 6f 45 6e 75 6d gthSid..Y.IoEnum 0xb2090ed0 65 72 61 74 65 44 65 76 69 63 65 4f 62 6a 65 63 erateDeviceObjec 0xb2090ee0 74 4c 69 73 74 00 75 03 50 73 47 65 74 56 65 72 tList.u.PsGetVer 0xb2090ef0 73 69 6f 6e 00 00 60 05 5a 77 53 65 74 49 6e 66 sion..`.ZwSetInf 0xb2090f00 6f 72 6d 61 74 69 6f 6e 46 69 6c 65 00 00 45 05 ormationFile..E. 0xb2090f10 5a 77 51 75 65 72 79 49 6e 66 6f 72 6d 61 74 69 ZwQueryInformati 0xb2090f20 6f 6e 46 69 6c 65 00 00 c9 05 77 63 73 6e 63 70 onFile....wcsncp 0xb2090f30 79 00 cc 05 77 63 73 73 74 72 00 00 8c 05 5f 73 y...wcsstr...._s 0xb2090f40 6e 77 70 72 69 6e 74 66 00 00 5c 01 49 6f 46 69 nwprintf..\.IoFi 0xb2090f50 6c 65 4f 62 6a 65 63 74 54 79 70 65 00 00 66 02 leObjectType..f. 0xb2090f60 4b 65 54 69 63 6b 43 6f 75 6e 74 00 6e 74 6f 73 KeTickCount.ntos 0xb2090f70 6b 72 6e 6c 2e 65 78 65 00 00 4d 00 4b 66 4c 6f krnl.exe..M.KfLo 0xb2090f80 77 65 72 49 72 71 6c 00 44 00 4b 65 52 61 69 73 werIrql.D.KeRais 0xb2090f90 65 49 72 71 6c 54 6f 44 70 63 4c 65 76 65 6c 00 eIrqlToDpcLevel. 0xb2090fa0 4f 00 4b 66 52 65 6c 65 61 73 65 53 70 69 6e 4c O.KfReleaseSpinL 0xb2090fb0 6f 63 6b 00 4c 00 4b 66 41 63 71 75 69 72 65 53 ock.L.KfAcquireS 0xb2090fc0 70 69 6e 4c 6f 63 6b 00 40 00 4b 65 47 65 74 43 pinLock.@.KeGetC 0xb2090fd0 75 72 72 65 6e 74 49 72 71 6c 00 00 48 41 4c 2e urrentIrql..HAL. 0xb2090fe0 64 6c 6c 00 4d 02 4b 65 52 65 73 74 6f 72 65 46 dll.M.KeRestoreF 0xb2090ff0 6c 6f 61 74 69 6e 67 50 6f 69 6e 74 53 74 61 74 loatingPointStat >>>This looks like the import address table (IAT), though definitely not all of it; the last entry on-screen seems to be cut off. Be exploratory, and scroll up past the beginning of the IAT. And then a little farther:
0xb208ffd0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb208ffe0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb208fff0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090050 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090060 17 00 00 00 74 72 75 65 63 72 79 70 74 70 61 73 ....truecryptpas 0xb2090070 73 77 6f 72 64 73 65 63 75 72 65 00 00 00 00 00 swordsecure..... 0xb2090080 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090090 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb20900a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb20900b0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb20900c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb20900d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb20900e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb20900f0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090100 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090110 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090120 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090130 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090140 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090150 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090160 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090170 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090180 00 00 00 00 46 ea 30 4f 00 00 00 00 f8 41 03 00 ....F.0O.....A.. 0xb2090190 01 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 a8 41 03 00 .............A.. 0xb20901a0 c8 41 03 00 e8 41 03 00 e0 0c 01 00 e0 00 01 00 .A...A.......... 0xb20901b0 2d 60 01 00 e9 60 01 00 10 60 01 00 59 65 01 00 -`...`...`..Ye.. 0xb20901c0 15 66 01 00 1b 60 01 00 06 42 03 00 16 42 03 00 .f...`...B...B.. 0xb20901d0 26 42 03 00 3c 42 03 00 5c 42 03 00 75 42 03 00 &B...B...B..uB.. 0xb20901e0 8b 42 03 00 ab 42 03 00 00 00 01 00 02 00 03 00 .B...B.......... 0xb20901f0 04 00 05 00 06 00 07 00 74 72 75 65 63 72 79 70 ........truecryp 0xb2090200 74 2e 73 79 73 00 5f 61 65 73 5f 64 65 63 72 79 t.sys._aes_decry 0xb2090210 70 74 40 31 32 00 5f 61 65 73 5f 65 6e 63 72 79 pt@12._aes_encry 0xb2090220 70 74 40 31 32 00 5f 61 65 73 5f 68 77 5f 63 70 pt@12._aes_hw_cp 0xb2090230 75 5f 64 65 63 72 79 70 74 40 38 00 5f 61 65 73 u_decrypt@8._aes 0xb2090240 5f 68 77 5f 63 70 75 5f 64 65 63 72 79 70 74 5f _hw_cpu_decrypt_ 0xb2090250 33 32 5f 62 6c 6f 63 6b 73 40 38 00 5f 61 65 73 32_blocks@8._aes 0xb2090260 5f 68 77 5f 63 70 75 5f 65 6e 61 62 6c 65 5f 73 _hw_cpu_enable_s 0xb2090270 73 65 40 30 00 5f 61 65 73 5f 68 77 5f 63 70 75 se@0._aes_hw_cpu 0xb2090280 5f 65 6e 63 72 79 70 74 40 38 00 5f 61 65 73 5f _encrypt@8._aes_ 0xb2090290 68 77 5f 63 70 75 5f 65 6e 63 72 79 70 74 5f 33 hw_cpu_encrypt_3 0xb20902a0 32 5f 62 6c 6f 63 6b 73 40 38 00 5f 69 73 5f 61 2_blocks@8._is_a 0xb20902b0 65 73 5f 68 77 5f 63 70 75 5f 73 75 70 70 6f 72 es_hw_cpu_suppor 0xb20902c0 74 65 64 40 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ted@0........... 0xb20902d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb20902e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb20902f0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0xb2090300 00 00 00 00 00 00 8b ff 55 8b ec 81 ec 98 00 00 ........U....... 0xb2090310 00 a1 80 8c 08 b2 33 c5 89 45 fc 56 57 8b 7d 08 ......3..E.VW.}. 0xb2090320 33 c0 0f b7 88 8a 05 09 b2 66 89 4c 05 bc 40 40 3........f.L..@@ 0xb2090330 66 85 c9 75 ed 33 c0 0f b7 88 66 05 09 b2 66 89 f..u.3....f...f. 0xb2090340 8c 05 7c ff ff ff 40 40 66 85 c9 75 ea 8b 35 44 ..|...@@f..u..5D 0xb2090350 a9 07 b2 8d 85 7c ff ff ff 50 8d 85 70 ff ff ff .....|...P..p... 0xb2090360 50 ff d6 8d 45 bc 50 8d 85 68 ff ff ff 50 ff d6 P...E.P..h...P.. 0xb2090370 8d 85 78 ff ff ff 50 6a 00 68 00 01 00 00 6a 22 ..x...Pj.h....j" 0xb2090380 8d 85 70 ff ff ff 50 6a 04 57 ff 15 a8 a8 07 b2 ..p...Pj.W...... 0xb2090390 85 c0 7c 6b 8b 85 78 ff ff ff 83 48 1c 10 8b 8d ..|k..x....H.... 0xb20903a0 78 ff ff ff 33 c0 40 89 41 5c 8b 8d 78 ff ff ff x...3.@.A\..x... 0xb20903b0 8b 49 28 6a 00 68 70 b2 08 b2 89 01 ff 15 fc a9 .I(j.hp.........Now, if the passphrase had not been chilling in plain sight, you'd have to dump the driver to a file, and comb it over with a python script kind of like:
import struct,string
def isasciistr(s):
return all(c in string.printable for c in s)
def findPassphrases(memdump):
img = open(memdump, 'rb', buffering=10240)
while True:
region = img.read(10240)
if len(region) == 0:
break
startoffset = 0
while startoffset < len(region):
offset = region.find('\x00\x00\x00', startoffset)
if offset > -1:
startoffset = offset+3
lengthField = region[offset-1]
#we found a set of three null bytes
length = struct.unpack('<B', region[offset-1])[0]
if length > 0:
passphrase = region[offset+3:offset+3+length]
lengthReal = len(passphrase)
#make sure we aren't hurtling off the region boundary
if offset+3+length+1 < 10240:
#make sure byte right after string is a null byte (sure, more should be null, but whatever)
if ord(region[offset+3+length+1]) != 0:
break
#make sure that the string is as long as the field said it would be
if isasciistr(passphrase) and ord(lengthField) == lengthReal:
#print the possibility
print "POSITIVE: "+passphrase + " EXPECT("+hex(ord(lengthField))+")"+" GOT("+hex(lengthReal)+")"
else:
break
findPassphrases()
Kudos to pants for the vast majority of the above script.
- syreal
